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Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates environmental externality when the structure of the externality is 
cumulative.  The evaluation exercise is based on the assumption that the agents in question 
form conjectural variations.  A number of environments are encompassed within this 
classification and have received due attention in the literature.  Each of these heterogeneous 
environments, however, possesses considerable analytical homogeneity and permit 
subscription to a general model treatment.  These environments include environmental 
externality, oligopoly and the analysis of the private provision of public goods. We highlight 
the general analytical approach by focusing on this latter context, in which debate centers 
around four issues: the existence of free-riding, the extent to which contributions are 
matched equally across individuals, the nature of conjectures consistent with equilibrium, 
and the allocative inefficiency of alternative regimes. This paper resolves each of these 
issues, with the following conclusions: A consistent-conjectures equilibrium exists in the 
private provision of public goods. It is the monopolistic-conjectures equilibrium. Agents act 
identically, contributing positive amounts of the public good in an efficient allocation of 
resources. There is complete matching of contributions among agents, no free-riding, and the 
allocation is independent of the number of members within the community. Thus the Olson 
conjecture—that inefficiency is exacerbated by community size—has no foundation in a 
consistent-conjectures, cumulative-externality, context (212 words). 
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Introduction 
Bowley's (1924) conjectural variations have been used repeatedly in the context of models of 
externality in which the externality is cumulative in nature.  This paper evaluates 
environmental externality when the externality is cumulative and the agents in question form 
conjectural variations.  A number of environments are encompassed within this classification 
and have received due attention in the literature.  These environments include environmental 
externality, oligopoly and the analysis of the private provision of public goods.  In the context 
of the latter setting interest is stimulated by an initial investigation by Cornes and Sandler 
(1984). Subsequent contributions that use conjectural variations have been made, 
respectively, by Sugden (1985), Cornes and Sandier (1985), Scafuri (1988), and Costrell 
(1991).  And considerable literary capital has evolved throughout the last decades.  Some 
particularly notable contributions include the comprehensive survey presented within the text 
of Cornes and Sandler (1986); a general treatment of congestion, employing consistent 
conjectures in Holloway (1996); equity theory and the voluntary provision of public goods 
studied by Chan et al. (1997); two-game analysis of interjurisdicational transfers by Bayindir-
Upmann (1998); synopsis of differences between public and club goods reviewed by McNutt 
(2000); Vicary’s (2000) analysis of donations to a public good in a large economy; the 
dyanamic conjectural-variations, differential games approach to the private provision of a 
public good by Itaya and Shimomura (2001); Rubio and Casino’s (2002) synopsis of the 
differences and similarities between public good provision and international enviornmental 
pollution control;  Itaya and Okamaya’s (2003) repeated-game analysis of the voluntary 
provision of public goods in a conjectural variations setup; the strategic analysis of public 
good provision presented by Figuières et al (2004); Fabella’s (2005) analysis of invisible-
hand structures in the private provision of public goods; Keenan et al.‘s (2006) analysis of the 
private provision of public goods when agents possess uncertainty; Kessing’s (2007) 
investigation of strategic complemnentarity in the dynamic provision of a discrete public 
good; Vali and Kian’s (2008) presentation of Monte-Carlo learning methods in dynamic 
conjectural variations contexts; Shaffer and Shogren’s (2009) general parameterization of 
repeated contests for a fixed prize; Heywood and Ye’s (2010) analysis of optimal 
privatization of public firms in mixed duopoly; Wood’s (2011) analysis of climate change in 
the presence of interactive agents and its similarities with public goods provision; Heywood 
and McGinty’s (2012) analysis of consistent conjectural variations teams and the presence of 
scale effects; Nakamura’s (2013) analysis of the performance of a social-welfare maximizing 
public firm in the presence of consistent conjectures; and, most recently, the analysis of the 
structure of demand dependencies when startegic price- and quantity-setting firms have 
consistent conjectural variations (Kalishnikov et al, 2014).   
Other examples exists, but these selected contributions serve to illuminate the general 
importance of the conjectural-variations approach to the analysis of public goods, and the 
number of issues—some still unresolved—surrounding the public good provision by private 
agents when the agents have conjectural variations.  These works, but especially the seminal 
contributions (Cornes and Sandler, 1984; Sugden, 1985; Cornes and Sandier, 1985; Scafuri, 
1988; and Costrell, 1991). identify three key issues, which are the central focus of the 
present contribution. These issues are the extent of under provision of the public good from 
its Pareto-efficient level; whether, under this criterion, the conjectural-variations 
equilibrium dominates the Nash equilibrium; and the extent of free riding and matching 
behaviour, if any, which are observed in equilibrium. 
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This paper makes four contributions. The first is to demonstrate that much of this debate can 
be resolved deductively. The deduction stems from a feature of the equilibrium, which is 
engendered by an assumption used in each of the previous contributions. This precludes the 
need to resort to sophisticated mathematical arguments to resolve the debate. This claim is 
substantiated further from a comprehensive treatment of conjectural variations applied to 
model the private provision of public goods, which is the second contribution of the paper. 
The third is to provide a formal link between the application in this paper, and its 
foundations in the static theory of homogeneous-product oligopoly. The fourth and final 
contribution is to elucidate further the key issues in the debate and, where possible, resolve 
them in the context of a model of consistent-conjectures equilibrium. In doing so, I 
demonstrate that several unsubstantiated claims about the private provision of public goods 
are, in fact, correct, although for the wrong reasons. 
In section two I present a brief summary of the debate and identify some of its salient features. 
In section three I present a heuristic argument, drawn from an assumption embedded within the 
framework, which I substantiate further in section four. Section five concludes the 
investigation. 
1. Background 
Comes and Sandler (1984) present diagrammatic and mathematical treatments of Nash 
equilibrium in the private provision of public goods. The contentious feature of this model is 
that the agents make contributions to the public good, ignoring the potential consequences of 
this action on the corresponding contributions from other agents in the community. This 
aspect of the model affords conjectural variations an opportunity to extend the theory, in an 
intuitive way. The corner-stone of the extended model is that it makes specific account of the 
subjective perception of each agent, about the corresponding contribution from the rest of 
the community, when agents make contributions to the public good. Although they discuss 
negative conjectures, Cornes and Sandler focus most of their attention on situations in 
which agents' contributions are positively correlated, that is, a situation in which a positive 
contribution from one individual gives rise to a positive contribution from the rest of the 
community. Within this class of model, they present a particular formulation for the 
conjectures and use it to demonstrate the 'Olson conjecture.' This is that the amount by 
which the equilibrium allocation falls short of the Pareto-optimal level is an increasing 
function of population size. A consistent-conjectures equilibrium, wherein the subjective 
perceptions of the agents are confirmed, is discussed, but not formalized. 
That positive conjectures prevail in equilibrium, prompts critical comment by Sugden (1985). 
He presents a compelling argument to suggest that negative conjectures are more likely. In 
this situation, own and rest-of-the-community contributions are inversely related. It is 
claimed that no equilibrium exists with strictly positive contributions, unless agents hold 
incorrect conjectures. This leads to the conclusion that contributions may not be made at all. 
It follows that negative conjectures—re-examined by Cornes and Sandier (1985)—lead to 
inefficiencies, which are greater under consistent conjectures than in Nash equilibrium. 
Scafuri (1988) questions the previous criteria used to characterize consistency. Necessary 
and sufficient conditions for consistent-conjectures equilibria are proposed. 
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Costrell (1991) formalizes the existence of interior solutions, extends the analysis to the case 
of semi-public goods, and characterizes consistent-conjectures, Nash-equilibrium, and 
Pareto-optimal allocations. The Nash-equilibrium allocation dominates the consistent-
conjectures allocation, and it is demonstrated that population growth under consistent 
conjectures can be immizerizing. 
2. Heuristic arguments 
Without exception, each of the studies above employs a key assumption. This is that the 
agents are identical. With this assumption, alone, we can deduce the following, important 
conclusion: 
Lemma (Identical Agents):   When agents are identical they act alike. 
Proof: Suppose that agents are identical, but do not act alike. A contradiction is then 
implied.  
The proof of this lemma relies on semantics, but its logic should be enough, for the moment, 
to persuade us of the results that follow. The lemma has some strong implications for models 
in which strategic interaction is depicted. Conjectural variations are, of course, an example of 
such a model. When agents conjecture consistently, and are assumed to be identical, a 
specific pattern of interactions is implied. In the debate about the private provision of public 
goods, most of the key issues can be resolved in a straight-forward manner, from application 
of the lemma. 
A first contention concerns the extent to which contributions by one individual are matched 
by contributions from the rest of the community. A related matter is the extent of free-riding, 
if any, which prevails in equilibrium. A third issue concerns the sign and magnitude of any 
consistent conjecture, should one exist, and a fourth issue pertains to the allocative 
consequences of the consistent-conjectures equilibrium. A fifth and final issue, which we 
wish to resolve, is whether any misallocation is exacerbated by population size. Applying the 
lemma, we acknowledge:  
Corollary 1 (Matching):  Matching is complete.  
Corollary 2 (Free-Riding):   There is no free riding.  
Corollary 3 (Consistency): The consistent conjecture is the monopolistic conjecture. 
Corollary 4 (Efficiency): The consistent-conjectures allocation is Pareto efficient.  
Corollary 5 (Size): Community size is inconsequential in the consistent-conjectures 
equilibrium. 
The first corollary follows naturally from the lemma, and the second corollary follows 
naturally from the first. Corollary 3 requires a little more. The intuition can be enhanced 
by considering an oligopoly. When a firm perceives, correctly, that its rivals are identical to 
itself, it knows that its adjustment will be matched entirely by a proportionate adjustment 
from each of its competitors. When this occurs, the firm computes the output level that 
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maximizes industry profits, and selects own output to be one Nth of that which is optimal 
for the industry as a whole. It does this knowing full well that each of its identical rivals will 
follow suit. In this manner, the industry behaves as though it were a perfect cartel. The output 
level at equilibrium is the monopolistic level, and Corollary 3 is proven. Corollary 4 is 
obtained through similar reasoning. Replace the words “industry profits” in the previous 
argument, with the words “community welfare,” and note: Since preferences are identical, 
cartel contributions to the public good maximize community welfare. It follows that the 
consistent-conjectures allocation with identical agents is Pareto efficient. Since these results 
hold independently from the number of agents assumed in equilibrium, Corollary 5 is 
obtained. 
That the conjectural-variations allocation is efficient requires two assumptions. The first is 
that the agents are identical. The second is that conjectures are consistent. It is the joint 
interaction of these two features of the model that engenders efficiency in the equilibrium 
allocation. In general, when either of these assumptions is relaxed, the allocation will be 
inefficient. 
The second of these assumptions is defensible on two accounts. The first follows from the 
wide-spread use of models in which agents possess perfect foresight. There can be little 
debate that this usage stems from the acceptance of rational expectations as an equilibrium 
concept in stochastic theory. Incompatible with this tenet, is a situation in which agents hold 
conjectures that are systematically unfulfilled. That conjectures should be consistent, seems 
quite plausible. The same, however, cannot be said for the other assumption: It is a difficult 
task to locate a real economy in which the agents are demonstrably similar. A natural 
question then arises: How robust are the conclusions drawn above to relaxing, this second 
assumption? In order to answer, a more formal account of equilibrium is required. One is 
presented below. 
3. Formal arguments 
For the purpose of comparing the identical-agents equilibrium with its counterpart, the 
presentation below assumes heterogeneous agents. Homogeneity is invoked as required. 
3.1  The model 
There are N individuals indexed {i, i = 1, 2, .., N}.  Each consumes a quantity, {yi, i = 1, 2, .., 
N}, of a private good, and makes a contribution, {xi, i = 1, 2, .., N}, to a pure, public 
good, which we denote, simply, x. The quantity of the public good and the individual 
contributions are related through the aggregation condition: 
 𝑥 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑁𝑖=1 ,           (1) 
Utility, {ui, i = 1, 2, .., N}, is derived from consumption of the private good and from the 
aggregate stock of the public good: 
 ui = Ui(yi,x),  i = 1, 2, .., N.        (2) 
About the functions {Ui(.), i = 1, 2, .., N}, we make the usual assumptions namely: 
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Assumption 1 (Monotonicity): ∂Ui(.)/∂yi, and ∂Ui(.)/∂x > 0, i = 1, 2, .., N. 
Assumption 2 (Quasi-Concavity): 
�
�
0 𝜕𝑈𝑖(.)
𝜕𝑦𝑖
𝜕𝑈𝑖(.)
𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑈𝑖(.)
𝜕𝑦𝑖
𝜕2𝑈𝑖(.)
𝜕𝑦𝑖
2
𝜕2𝑈𝑖(.)
𝜕𝑦𝑖𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑈𝑖(.)
𝜕𝑥
𝜕2𝑈𝑖(.)
𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑦𝑖
𝜕2𝑈𝑖(.)
𝜕𝑥2
�
� > 0, i = 1, 2, .., N.  
Assumption 3 (Essentiality):  lim𝑦𝑖→0 − 𝜕𝑈𝑖(.)𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑈𝑖(.)
𝜕𝑦𝑖
= 0  and lim𝑥→0 − 𝜕𝑈𝑖(.)𝜕𝑥𝜕𝑈𝑖(.)
𝜕𝑦𝑖
= −∞, i = 1, 2, ..N. 
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that indifference curves in the yi-x plane are smooth and convex 
to the origin, reflecting declining marginal rates of substitution.  Assumption 3 implies that, 
compared to a consumption bundle containing nothing of either of the two goods, agents 
strictly prefer any alternative bundle containing positive amounts of both goods. 
 Let {σi, i = 1, 2, .., N} denote a set of income endowments, which are strictly positive 
and finite, and assume that goods are measured such that prices are one.  Then,  
 βi ≡ {(yi,x) | yi +  xi ≤ σi}, yi ≥ 0, xi ≥ 0},  i =1, 2, .., N,     (3) 
define the budget sets.  Assumption 1 implies that agents select bundles in βi that lie on their 
budget constraints.  When deciding on their contributions {xi, i = 1, 2, .., N} they form 
conjectural variations.  These are expressions of the form {xj = χij(xi), j = 1, 2, .., N}, which 
depict perceptions about the relationship between own contributions and those of the 
remaining members of the community.  Each agent solves: 
 Problem 1: max𝑦𝑖,𝑥     𝑢𝑖 = 𝑈𝑖(𝑦𝑖, 𝑥) 
   subject to: σi = yi  + xi, 
     𝑥 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑁𝑖=1 ,     
      xj = χij(xi),  j = 1, 2, .., N, 
              i = 1, 2, .., N. (4) 
To each conjectural variation corresponds a conjectural elasticity, or, simply, a conjecture, 
depicting perceptions about rates of response. For notational simplicity I include {χii(xi), i = 
1, 2, .., N}, depicting each agent’s conjecture about itself. Let {𝜃�𝑖𝑗 ≡ �𝜕𝜒𝑖𝑗(. )/𝜕𝑥𝑖��𝑥𝑖/
𝜒𝑖𝑗(. )�, 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁} denote i’s perception of j’s response when agent i adjusts its 
contribution to the public good. If agents observe contribution levels and know how to count 
equation (1) implies a set of correspondences,  {𝑥 = 𝜒𝑖(𝑥𝑖) ≡ ∑ 𝜒𝑖𝑗(𝑥𝑖)𝑁𝑗=1 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}, 
relating own contributions to the community aggregate, and another set, 
{𝜃�𝑖 ≡ ∑ �
𝑥𝑗
𝑥
�𝑁𝑗=1 𝜃�𝑖𝑗 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}, relating the inter-agent conjectures, to the set of 
aggregate ones, {𝜃�𝑖 ≡ (𝜕𝜒𝑖(. )/𝜕𝑥𝑖)(𝑥𝑖/𝜒𝑖(. )), 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}.  By assuming that agents 
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know how to count, we avoid some substantial algebra. However, the correspondences above 
should be kept in mind as we proceed.  Making appropriate substitutions, the constrained 
optimization in Problem 1 can be reduced to: 
 Problem 2:  max𝑦𝑖,𝑥      𝑢𝑖 = 𝑈𝑖(𝜎𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 ,𝜒𝑖(𝑥𝑖) ,     i = 1, 2, .., N.    (5) 
The corresponding first-order conditions are: 
 -∂Ui(.)/∂yi + ∂Ui(.)/∂x ×  ∂χi(.)/∂xi  ≡ ∂Ui(xi|σi)/∂xi = 0,      i = 1, 2, .., N.    (6) 
The appearance of the conjectures {∂χi(.)/∂xi, i = 1, 2, .., N} reflects a departure  from the usual 
Nash rule, which equates the marginal rate of substitution to the price ratio. Unless the 
conjectures are zero or non-finite, Assumptions 1-3 guarantee an interior solution to (5). 
Applying some standard manipulations, the first-order conditions in (6) can be rewritten: 
 𝜃�𝑖 �
𝑥
𝑥𝑖
�𝑀𝑅𝑆(𝑦𝑖, 𝑥) = 1,     𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁,       (7) 
where MRS(yi,x) ≡ ∂Ui(.)/∂x ÷ ∂Ui(.)/∂yi . 
In this context, the static Nash equilibrium is characterized by the set of conjectures 
{𝜃�𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖/𝑥, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}, but many other outcomes are feasible. This, of course—if 
nothing else—is the redeeming feature of conjectural variations, but it also leads to an 
‘embarrassment of riches.’ Which of the possible solutions to this problem will prevail in 
equilibrium? In other words, which values for the conjectures, {𝜃�𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}, and the 
community shares, {xi/x, l, 2, .., N}, are consistent with equilibrium? 
The presentation in this paper parallels the situation in the static theory of oligopoly. 
There the domains of the conjectures are contained between two familiar extremes. One is 
the set, {𝜃�𝑖 = 0, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}, which synthesizes competitive behaviour. The other, 
{𝜃�𝑖 = 1, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}, depicts monopoly. In the first case the agents conjecture that their 
behaviour has an imperceptible impact on industry output. In the second, they conjecture that 
adjustments are matched proportionately by the rest of the community. An intermediate 
point of interest is the equilibrium with Cournot conjectures, {𝜃�𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖/𝑥, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}, 
which are consistent with the Nash rule presented above. 
Unlike oligopoly, the present application—which is somewhat novel—precludes use of 
familiar paradigms to restrict the domains of the conjectures. However, from (7), the 
domains can be bounded by applying some reasonable assumptions. First, negative 
conjectures can be ruled out by invoking Assumptions 1-3. Monotonicity implies that the 
marginal rate of substitution is positive. Essentiality implies that, at equilibrium, 
contribution levels are also strictly positive. They are also finite, since they are bounded by 
finite endowments of income. It follows that the conjectures cannot be negative at the 
equilibrium depicted by (7). Neither can they be zero, because convexity of the indifference 
curves implies that the marginal rate of substitution is finite at the interior optimum. It 
follows that, in equilibrium, the conjectures must satisfy {𝜃�𝑖 > 0, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}. 
 
-7- 
 
To further restrict the domains of the conjectures, an additional criterion is required. We 
will use consistency. That is, given a set of actual responses, {𝜃𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}, about which 
the agents conjecture, {𝜃�𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}, we will use the conditions {𝜃�𝑖 =  𝜃𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁} 
to identify equilibrium. Moreover, we will prove it to be unique. Before turning to examine 
this issue in detail, we should characterize efficiency in the context of (7), and compare the 
Pareto-efficient allocations with those derived in Nash equilibrium. 
3.2 Comparing Allocations 
 
To obtain the set of Pareto-efficient allocations, select {yi, i = l, 2, .., N} and x to solve:  
 
 Problem 3:  max𝑦𝑖,𝑥      𝑢𝑖 = 𝑈𝑖(𝑦𝑖, 𝑥) 
 
   subject to:  𝑈𝑗�𝑦𝑗 , 𝑥� ≥  𝑢�𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖; 
 
   ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑁𝑖=1 + 𝑥 ≤  ∑ 𝜎𝑖𝑁𝑖=1 .                  (8) 
 
Under Assumptions 1-3, the first-order conditions corresponding to this problem are 
sufficient for a maximum. The set of efficient allocations is characterized by the condition 
that the sum of marginal rates of substitution equates with the price ratio. That is,  
 
 ∑ 𝑀𝑅𝑆(𝑦𝑖, 𝑥) =   1,𝑁𝑖=1                     (9) 
 
characterizes the set of efficient allocations. Summing over the N agents in (7), the 
corresponding conditions in Nash equilibrium are: 
 
 ∑ 𝑀𝑅𝑆(𝑦𝑖, 𝑥) =   𝑁.𝑁𝑖=1                   (10) 
 
The corresponding condition under conjectural variations is: 
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 ∑ 𝑀𝑅𝑆(𝑦𝑖, 𝑥) =   ∑ 𝑥𝑖/𝑥𝜃�𝑖𝑁𝑖=1 .𝑁𝑖=1                  (11) 
Comparing (9), (10) and (II), an index of economic inefficiency is implied by the extent to 
which the right-hand sides of these equations depart from the value one. Clearly, the extent 
of departure in Nash equilibrium increases with the number of agents in the community, 
which is the Olson conjecture. Under conjectural variations, this need not be the case. In 
general, the extent of departure depends on the magnitude of each agent's conjecture in 
relation to its share in community contributions to the public good. An important feature of 
(11), which does not appear to be recognized previously, is that the conjectural-variations 
equilibrium may, in fact, lead to an allocation in which too much of the public good is 
supplied. 
What is the extent of departure from an efficient allocation under consistent 
conjectures? We turn now to examine this issue. 
3.3 Equilibrium 
Before examining consistency in detail, a few comments about the equilibrium in (7) are in 
order. The first is that it is static. It is static in both the Nash situation and in the general, 
conjectural-variations setting. In both cases it is assumed that the first-order conditions in (6) 
define a strict local maximum on the interior of each agent's budget set, and that the 
corresponding second-order conditions hold with strict inequality. In Nash equilibrium, 
Assumptions 1 and 2 are sufficient to guarantee that these conditions hold, but they are 
insufficient, in general, under conjectural variations. We will assume, momentarily, that 
they are satisfied and, subsequent to deriving consistent conjectures, ascertain the further 
restrictions that are required in order for them to hold. 
 
When the second-order conditions are met, an equilibrium is defined by (1) and (6) in the 
optimal contributions from each of the agents, {xi*, i = 1, 2, .., N}, and the aggregate stock 
of contributions, x*.  That is, given a set of aggregate endowments, {σi, i = 1, 2, .., N}, 
equations (6) determine the set, {xi*, i = 1, 2, .., N}, from which equation (1) then determines 
x*. 
 A focus on consistent conjectures requires that we examine comparative statics. 
Consequently, the equilibrium is no longer static. There are now two phases to the game. In 
the first stage, firms form conjectures and select contribution levels, conditional on the 
responses they expect from their peers. This aspect of the equilibrium is encompassed by 
(6). An important point to recognize is that, given the information available to them, each 
individual makes its contribution in an optimal manner. There is, then, no tendency for 
adjustment until some force, exogenous to equilibrium, displaces the variables in (6) from 
their initial levels. When adjustments occur, agents observe the responses of their peers and 
compare these to the ones they conjectured in the initial equilibrium. When the conjectures 
and the adjustments conform, we say that conjectures are consistent. However, the equilibrium 
concept possesses an additional subtlety. The responses computed around the equilibrium 
will depend on the values of all parameters in the model. The conjectures {𝜃�𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}, 
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comprise a subset of these parameters. It follows that the solution to a set of fixed-point 
equations is implied. 
This problem received a good deal of attention in the oligopoly literature in the 1980's. 
However, both a general characterization of it and a general solution to it have proved 
elusive. The proposed methodology in this literature is to compute the response between any 
pair of firms, ceteris paribus, by applying the implicit function theorem to one of the firm's 
first-order conditions.  
Unfortunately, this procedure is flawed. 
The reason stems from the definition of the conjectural variations, {�𝜒𝑖𝑗(𝑥𝑖)�, 𝑖 =1, 2, . . ,𝑁}.  Since agent i has conjectures about the contributions of each of its peers, the 
contribution levels {𝑥𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖}, no longer appear in agent i's objective function. 
It follows that these contribution levels are absent from the corresponding first-order 
conditions. Consequently, the traditional methodology cannot be applied because it requires 
us to perturb contribution levels of two agents, but only one appears. Any approach that 
perturbs the contribution level of a peer in the first-order conditions is inconsistent with the 
conjectural-variations paradigm. An alternative approach is required. 
 The method used below is more akin to traditional equilibrium analysis: Equations (1) 
and (6) are assumed to determine an equilibrium in the N+1 endogenous variables, {𝑥, {𝑥𝑖 , 𝑖 =1, 2, . . ,𝑁}}, given the N endowments, {𝜎𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}. When the endowments are 
displaced, we compute the changes in contributions which occur, and then proceed to find 
values for the conjectures that equate the observed adjustments with the ones conjectured in 
the initial equilibrium. 
3.4 Disequilibrium 
When displacing the equilibrium, it will prove convenient to express adjustments in 
proportional-change terms. That is, for some variable, v, let 𝑣 �  ≡ ∆𝑣
𝑣
 denote its proportional 
change.  Applying this calculus in (1) and (6), the adjustments, {  𝑥 �  ≡ ∆𝑥
𝑥
, {  𝑥�𝑖  ≡ ∆𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑖  }, i = 
1, 2, .., N}, which emanate from the shocks,{  𝜎�𝑖  ≡ ∆𝜎𝑖𝜎𝑖  }, i = 1, 2, .., N}, are: 
 𝑥 � =  ∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑥
𝑁
𝑖=1  𝑥�𝑖,                 (12)
 𝜐𝑖𝑥�𝑖 +  𝜇𝑖𝜎�𝑖 =   0,  i = 1, 2, .., N,               (13) 
where the parameters υi ≡ xi∂2Ui(.)/∂xi2  ≡ 𝜐𝑖(𝜃�𝑖), and µi ≡ σi∂2Ui(.)/∂xi∂σi  ≡ 𝜇𝑖(𝜃�𝑖), depend 
implicitly on the conjectures. 
3.5 Consistent conjectures 
From (12) and (13) we can compute the ratios {𝑥�/𝑥�𝑖 =   𝜃, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}, and {𝑥�𝑗/𝑥�𝑖 ≡
𝜃𝑖𝑗 , 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}, which are rates of change in contributions relative to one’s own.  It is 
these sets of adjustments about which the agents form their conjectures. For immediate 
purposes, however, only the aggregate effects are of interest. A set of conjectures is 
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consistent if they solve the fixed-point problem that equates the subjective perceptions 
{𝜃�𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁} to the set of true values {𝜃𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}.  Formally: 
Definition (A Consistent-Conjectures Equilibrium): A consistent-conjectures equilibrium is 
a set of contributions {x*{xi*, i=1, 2, .., N}} that satisfies (1) and (6), a set of adjustments 
{𝑥 �  ≡ ∆𝑥
𝑥
, {  𝑥�𝑖  ≡ ∆𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑖  }, i = 1, 2, .., N}, that satisfy (12) and (13), and a set of 
solutions{𝜃�𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁} , to the fixed-point problem: 
        𝜃�𝑖 =  𝑥�(𝜃�1 ,𝜃�2,..,𝜃�𝑁)𝑥�𝑖(𝜃�𝑖) , 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁.  
3.6 Results 
We are now in a position to state formally the conclusions that were drawn in section 3 
under the assumption that the agents are identical. The first task is to prove the lemma, 
which is restated as follows: 
Lemma (Identical Agents):   When agents are identical they act alike. 
Proof: The first-order conditions corresponding to the problem of choosing xi to maximize { 
Ui(σi-xi,χi(xi)), i = 1, 2, .., N} are {∂Ui(xi|σi)/∂xi = 0, i = 1, 2, .., N}. When the functions 
{Ui(.), i = 1, 2, .., N} and {χi(.), i = 1, 2, .., N} are the same for all individuals, and the 
endowments {σi, i = 1, 2, .., N} are also the same, such that {Ui(.) = U(.), i = 1, 2, .., N}, 
{χi(.) = χ(.), i = 1, 2, .., N}  and {σi = σ, i = 1, 2, .., N}, then the first-order conditions are 
identical for all agents.  When the corresponding second-order conditions hold with strict 
inequality, these equations define a set of unique solutions: xi* = xj*, ∀ i,j = l, 2, ..,N. Since 
each first-order condition is the same, a small displacement around the equilibrium yields 
identical adjustments {𝑥�𝑖 =  𝑥�𝑗 , 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}. Consequently, when agents are identical 
they act alike. 
Since xi* = xj* ∀ i,j = 1, 2, .., N, contributions by each individual are completely matched by 
the contribution from the rest of the community. This proves the first two corollaries, 
namely: 
Corollary 1 (Matching): Matching is complete. 
Corollary 2 (Free-Riding): There is no free riding. 
Deducing the third corollary requires two steps. The first is to compute the ratios of 
adjustments in the identical-firms equilibrium. These are, respectively {𝑥 �
𝑥�𝑖
≡ 𝜃𝑖 = 1, i = 1, 
2, .., N}. Consequently, if the conjectures are consistent, they are the ones {𝜃�𝑖 = 1, 𝑖 =1, 2, . . ,𝑁}. The second step is to confirm that these values are compatible with strict 
inequality of the second-order conditions corresponding to (6). We shall demonstrate this 
subsequently. Since the conjectures, {𝜃�𝑖 = 1, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}, are consistent with monopolistic 
equilibrium, we have:  
Corollary 3   (Consistency): The consistent conjecture is the monopolistic conjecture. 
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The fourth corollary follows as a simple matter of comparing the allocation given by 
(9) with that in (11).  Since the shares sum to one, observe that (11) conforms with (9) 
when  {𝜃�𝑖 = 1, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁} are employed in the right-hand side of the former. 
Consequently, we have: 
Corollary 4 (Efficiency): The consistent-conjectures allocation is Pareto efficient. 
Finally, observing that N no longer appears in the right side of (11), proves: 
Corollary 5   (Size):    In the consistent-conjecture equilibrium community size is 
inconsequential. 
This last result must be interpreted with some care, as we shall see below. 
3.7 Existence 
It remains to examine whether a consistent-conjectures equilibrium actually exists. This is 
established with reference to the second-order conditions, which appear as part of the 
comparative statics in (13). The adjustment in each agent's contribution emanating from a 
change in its endowment can be expressed: 
 𝑥�𝑖 =  −𝜇𝑖�𝜃�𝑖�𝜐𝑖�𝜃�𝑖�   𝜎�𝑖,       𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁,                 (14) 
and rewritten 
 𝑥�𝑖 =  −−𝜕2𝑈𝑖(.)/𝜕𝑦𝑖2+(𝜕2𝑈𝑖(.)/𝜕𝑥2)×𝜃�𝑖×(𝑥𝑖/𝑥)×(𝜎𝑖/𝑥𝑖)𝔇   𝜎�𝑖,       𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁,           (15) 
where 𝔇 ≡  −𝜕2𝑈𝑖(. )/𝜕𝑦𝑖2 − 2 × (𝜕2𝑈𝑖(. )/𝜕𝑦𝑖𝜕𝑥) + (𝜕2𝑈𝑖(. )/𝜕𝑥2) × 𝜃�𝑖 × (𝑥𝑖/𝑥) −(𝜕𝑈𝑖(. )/𝜕𝑥) × (𝜕2𝜒𝑖(. )/𝜕𝑥𝑖2).   
The expression in the denominator on the right-hand side is the second-order condition. Its 
sign depends on three components: the values of the conjectural variations in relation to 
the market shares, the specific nature of preferences, and the interaction of marginal utility 
with the curvature of the conjectural variations. It can be shown that in the symmetric, 
consistent-conjectures equilibrium, the consistent conjectural variations are affine. In this 
case, the second-order conditions become: 
 𝔇 ≡  −𝜕2𝑈𝑖(. )/𝜕𝑦𝑖2 − 2 × (𝜕2𝑈𝑖(. )/𝜕𝑦𝑖𝜕𝑥) × 𝑁 + (𝜕2𝑈𝑖(. )/𝜕𝑥2) × 𝑁 <  0. (16)  
By Assumption 2, these conditions are satisfied when the equilibrium contains one 
individual.  In this case, the conditions in (16) are identical to those in Nash equilibrium. 
However, for N ≥ 2, quasi-concavity alone is insufficient to guarantee satisfaction of (16). 
Consequently, the restrictions on preferences that ensure existence under consistent 
conjectures are more stringent than those in Nash equilibrium. 
3.8 Discussion 
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The set-up above is formally equivalent to the one considered in (Holloway, 1995). There is 
characterized a general solution to the consistent-conjectures problem for a general, N-firm 
oligopoly, in which the agents are dissimilar, A key step in the solution procedure is to 
formalize a condition that is necessary for consistency, and which leads, ultimately, to a 
solution to the problem.   This condition is: 
 ∑ 𝑥𝑖/𝑥
𝜃�𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  =   1.                  (17) 
This expression appears in equation (11), where we characterize the allocation under 
conjectural variations. Since this condition is necessary for consistency it proves an 
additional property of the equilibrium, namely: 
Corollary 6  (Totality):    Every consistent-conjectures allocation is Pareto efficient. 
The intuition for this result is the same as that employed in the identical-agents setting: 
When agents conjecture consistently, they correctly internalize the behaviour of their peers. 
In Holloway (1995) are derived two sets of Nash strategies, which provide solutions to 
(17). One is the set of collusive conjectures, {𝜃�𝑖 = 1, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}.  The other is the set {𝜃�𝑖 = 𝑁𝑥𝑖/𝑥, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}, which contain conjectures N times the so-called Cournot 
conjectures. However, in this oligopoly setting, existence is unattainable when the firms are 
heterogeneous. Consequently, the identical-firms, consistent-conjectures equilibrium is 
unique. 
A similar result can be demonstrated here, with reference to equations (15). The logic 
follows from observing the conditions {𝜃𝑖 ≡  𝑥�𝑖 𝑥�⁄ = 𝜃�𝑖 = 1, i = 1, 2, .., N}, which are 
necessary for consistency. These conditions imply that the set of consistent adjustments must 
satisfy {𝜃�𝑖  𝑥�𝑖 = 𝜑 = 1, i = 1, 2, .., N}, where 𝜑 is some common, non-zero scalar. That is, the 
adjustments must be inversely related to the conjectures, and of the form {𝑥�𝑖 = 𝜃�𝑖  −1 𝜑, i = 
1, 2, .., N},  From inspection of (15), no conjectures {𝜃�𝑖 = 𝑁𝑥𝑖/𝑥, 𝑖 = 1, 2, . . ,𝑁}, satisfy 
these conditions and, hence, the identical-agents equilibrium is unique. Accordingly, we 
conclude as follows: 
Corollary 7  (Uniqueness):   The identical-agents, consistent-conjectures equilibrium is unique.  
4. Concluding Comments 
We began this investigation by citing four objectives. The first was to demonstrate that 
much of the debate about the private provision of public goods can be resolved, deductively, 
from an assumption embedded in the equilibrium. With the exception of the existence 
conditions, the results above confirm this claim: A great deal can be deduced from 
exploring the implications that agents are identical. The second objective was to present a 
comprehensive treatment of conjectural variations applied to the private provision of 
public goods. We did this for the heterogeneous-agents model, but demonstrated that no 
equilibrium exists unless individuals are identical. To argue this I invoked some recent 
results on conjectural variations in oligopoly and, thus, provided a formal link between the 
use of conjectural variations in the present context, and their foundations in the static theory 
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of oligopoly. This was the third objective. The fourth was to resolve several key issues in 
the debate about the private provision of public goods. In conclusion, a consistent-
conjectures equilibrium exists. It is the monopolistic-conjectures equilibrium. Each of the 
agents acts identically, contributing positive amounts of the public good in an efficient 
allocation of resources.   There is complete matching of contributions, no free-riding, 
and the allocation is independent of the number of agents in the community. Thus the 
Olson conjecture—that inefficiency is exacerbated by community size—is misplaced in a 
consistent-conjectures context. 
More generally, the results of this paper have something to say about models of strategic 
interaction, in which the agents are identical. Identical agents must act alike. This indicts 
individuals to a specific interaction, which, like the assumption itself, is quite unreasonable. 
Moreover, the fact that individuals are dissimilar provides the compelling basis for 
considering strategic interaction in the first place. In the conjectural-variations context, the 
stringency of the consistency criteria precludes use of the model in this more realistic 
setting. A good deal of caution is advisable when interpreting results under the identical-
agents assumption. Relaxing this condition is surely a fruitful focus for future research. 
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